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Abstract
Purpose - This paper aims to examine the stability of dividend policy using a unique data set.
Design/methodology/approach - The paper is based on the Lintner model that is used to test the dividend
smoothing behavior. The specific econometric method used for panel data is Tobit regression.
Findings - The evidence shows that Omani firms adopt a policy of smoothing dividends. This stability of
dividends does not support the predictions suggested by the high bank leverage, absence of taxes, and the
variability of dividend payments in Oman.
Research limitations/implications - This study highlights the need for further research in order to examine
whether these results have any effect on dividend initiations and omissions in Oman.
Practical implications - The findings of this study show that there are differences in dividend policies
between the Omani companies and those in developed markets. Potential investors in the Omani market
should be aware about these differences in making their investment decisions.
Originality/value - This paper examines stability of dividend policy in a unique environment where firms
distribute almost 100 percent of their profits in dividends, firms are highly levered mainly through bank loans,
there are no taxes on dividends and capital gains, and there is variability in cash dividend payments. These
factors suggest a diminished role of dividend stability in Oman. It is an empirical issue to examine whether
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Dividend Stability in a Unique Environment 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – This paper aims to examine the stability of dividend policy using a unique data set. 
Design/methodology/approach – The paper is based on the Lintner (1956) model that is 
used to test the dividend smoothing behavior. The specific econometric method used for panel 
data is Tobit regression. 
Findings – The evidence shows that Omani firms adopt a policy of smoothing dividends. 
This stability of dividends does not support the predictions suggested by the high bank 
leverage, absence of taxes, and the variability of dividend payments in Oman.  
Implications – This study highlights the need for further research in order to examine 
whether these results have any effect on dividend initiations and omissions in Oman. 
Practical implications – The findings of this study show that there are differences in 
dividend policies between the Omani companies and those in developed markets. Potential 
investors in the Omani market should be aware about these differences in making their 
investment decisions.   
Originality/value – This paper examine stability of dividend policy in a unique environment 
where (1) firms distribute almost 100% of their profits in dividends, (2) firms are highly 
levered mainly through bank loans, (3) there are no taxes on dividends and capital gains, (4) 
and there is variability in cash dividend payments. These factors suggest a diminished role of 
dividend stability in Oman. It is an empirical issue to examine whether this is indeed true. The 
authors are not aware of any other study on dividend stability using data with these unique 
factors. 
Keywords Dividends, Taxes, Agency theory, Oman 
Paper type Research paper 
 
1. Introduction 
Dividend policy remains one of the most controversial and puzzling issues in 
corporate finance. Miller and Modigliani (1961) (M&M) lay the theoretical 
foundation of dividend policy research. They asserted that in perfect markets, 
dividend policy has no impact on firms' value. In doing so, they assumed that the 
firm's investment is fixed so all positive net present value projects will be financed 
regardless of dividend policy. Higher dividend payout ratios lead to a lower retained 
earnings and capital gains, and vice versa, leaving shareholders wealth unaffected.  
Contrary to this theory, Lintner (1956) shows that US companies follow an adaptive 
process in their dividend policies by smoothing their payouts. Specifically, Lintner 
documents that firms maintain target dividend payout ratio and adjust their dividend 
policy to this target.  He also shows that firms pursue a stable dividend policy and 
gradually increase dividends given the target payout ratio. Brav et al. (2005) provide 
further support to dividend stability. They find that maintaining the dividend level is a 
priority on par with investment decisions for U.S. firms. Using data from the UK, 
Michaely and Roberts (2007) report that dividend smoothing is more pronounced in 
public firms relative to private firms where potential agency issues and information 
asymmetries are more pronounced. In the same vein, Leary and Michaely (2009) find 
that dividend smoothing has been increasing over the past 50 years, suggesting that 
managers are more concerned about dividend smoothing today. More recent empirical 
papers have also supported dividend stability (Kato and Lowenstein (1995), Lasfer 
(1996), Dewenter and Warther (1998), Aivazian et al. (2003b), among others). 
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The majority of these studies are conducted using U.S. data. One natural 
question is whether these stable dividend policies are peculiar to the U.S. or they are 
also prominent in countries where the tax regime and/or institutional and economical 
characteristics are significantly different. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate stability of dividends of firms listed 
in the Muscat Securities Market over the period 1989 to 2004. There are several 
important economic and institutional features that make Oman a unique and 
interesting environment to examine the stability of dividend policy. There are reasons 
that may suggest Omani firms may adopt a smoothing dividend policy and there are 
other reasons that may suggest otherwise. First, one of the main features of the Omani 
system is that the Capital Market Authority (CMA) requires firms to have a dividend 
policy and to disclose it in the annual reports. Hence, the pressure to maintain high 
dividends may be high in Oman. In a similar vein, Omani firms distribute almost 
100% of their profits in dividends. This is very different from the western countries 
which are known to distribute moderate dividends. Omani investor's attitude towards 
dividends may contribute to the higher payout ratio. Most investors in Oman consider 
dividends as the principal component of stock returns. Whereas dividends are tax 
disadvantaged in the U.S. and many other western countries which may lead firms to 
decrease dividend payout (Poterba, 2004; Chetty and Saez, 2005; Korkeamaki et al., 
2009, among others), dividends in Oman are not taxed. The high dividend payout 
ratio in Oman may be attributable to the absence of taxes on dividends. Omani firms 
appear to have an incentive to pay dividends due to the non taxability of dividends. 
Leary and Michaely (2009) show that firms with high payout ratio smooth more. 
Likewise, the absence of taxes in Oman may have an impact on dividend stability. 
Rozycki (1997) demonstrates that personal income taxes provide managers with a 
motivation to smooth the dividend payments. He provides evidence that dividend 
smoothing has increased the wealth for a tax paying investor by reducing the present 
value of the investor's future expected income tax liabilities. Therefore, the absence of 
personal income taxes is expected to reduce the importance of dividend stability in 
Oman.  
Second, Omani companies rely heavily on bank financing (Al-Yahyaee, 
2006). Banks usually asks for a filing of financial information in a standardized form. 
They also conduct regular visits to the sites so they become familiar with the 
company. Banks also require firms to pay the loan through monthly mortgage type 
installments [1]. These practices are expected to reduce the moral hazard problem as 
well as agency costs. In this vein, Aivazian et al. (2003b) argue that dividend stability 
should be less important in bank centric countries like Oman. Dewenter and Warther 
(1998) also suggest that dividend stability may not be important for companies that 
rely on bank debt due to bank monitoring. Hence, the reliance of Omani firms on 
bank debt financing implies that dividend stability may not be important for Omani 
firms. 
However, there are reasons that may suggest that banks in Oman may be 
relatively ineffective in monitoring. Saidi and Kumar (2008) suggest that corporate 
governance in Oman is relatively weak. They demonstrate that banks in Arab Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries including Oman play limited role in 
scrutinizing corporate governance practices of borrowers [2]. Saidi and Kumar (2008) 
indicate that there is a relatively weaker institutional characteristic in the GCC 
countries including Oman in terms of disclosure and transparency requirements, 
creditor rights, enforcement of contracts, regulations, oversight, and minority 
shareholder rights. Mohamed et al. (2008) find that many Omani firms do not comply 
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with the Code of Corporate Governance [3]. They observe that the implementation, 
monitoring, and enforcement aspects of the corporate governance regulatory regime 
are still at a nascent stage [4]. La Port et al. (1998) claim that the lack of transparency, 
inadequate legal infrastructure, and weak investment protection in emerging markets 
all enhance the role of dividends as a reputation mechanism. In this case, and even 
with the close banking relations and closely held nature of firms, dividend payment is 
extremely important to attract capital (Aivazian et al., 2003b). The relatively weak 
institutional variables and the relative noncompliance with corporate governance 
codes may reduce the effectiveness of banks in monitoring firms. This may suggest 
that the impact of bank-centricity on dividend stability may be relatively ineffective in 
Oman. The relatively weak governance practices in Oman may induce firms to pay 
out more dividends to offset the weak monitoring through corporate governance 
mechanism. John and Knyazeva (2008) claim that firms will use payout policy to 
mitigate the agency conflict due to poor governance. They argue that poor corporate 
governance exacerbates the agency costs of free cash flow. Hence, a higher level of 
dividends is necessary to impose a constraint on the manager. Consistent with their 
proposition, John and Knyazeva (2008) find that firms with weak corporate 
governance are more likely to pay higher dividends. Similarly, Knyazeva (2008) 
shows that weakly governed managers engage in more dividend smoothing and pay 
high dividends.  
Although there has been a considerable amount of research on both corporate 
governance and dividend policy, theoretical models on the link between corporate 
governance and dividends are still sparse. Rozeff (1982) and Jensen (1986) develop 
the agency cost explanation of why companies may pay dividends. Rozeff (1982) 
argues that dividend payments are part of the firm's optimal monitoring/bonding 
package and serve to reduce agency costs. Jensen (1986) claims that managers with 
substantial free cash flow can increase dividends and thereby pay out cash that could 
otherwise be invested in low-return projects or wasted. In other words, higher 
dividends may reduce the agency costs of free cash flow. There are other studies that 
focus on particular types of shareholders and address the question of whether certain 
types of shareholders reduce or increase the need for dividend as a monitoring device. 
Government-controlled firms are expected to suffer most from agency problem as 
they are ultimately owned by the citizens. As most citizens are only indirect 
shareholders of government-controlled firms, they have few incentives to monitor the 
management (Gugler, 2003). Consequently, the managers of government-controlled 
firms will prefer a stable dividend policy with high dividends to keep their principals 
happy. Gugler (2003) examines the potential impact of a range of different types of 
shareholders on dividends for a sample of Austrian firms and report evidence that 
government-controlled firms have the highest dividend payout and practice dividend 
smoothing.  
Third, Omani firms are owned by a small number of investors who have 
controlling interests. Al-Yahyaee et al. (2009) show that the average ownership of 
MSM-listed firms who owned at least ten percent of the issued capital was 52 percent. 
A significant part of this ownership belongs to the government. In fact, Al-Yahyaee 
(2006) shows that government ownership is a significant factor that affects dividend 
policy in Oman. Firms with high Government ownership pay more dividends. Hence, 
the higher dividend payout and the stability of dividends in Oman may be the 
consequence of corporate control. The high government ownership in Oman implies 
that the potential agency problem is likely to be high due to the few incentives of the 
shareholders (government) to monitor the management. Consequently, dividends in 
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Oman may serve as a corporate governance device bonding managers to generate 
sufficient cash flow to honour the precommitted level of dividends. Therefore, firms 
in Oman are more likely to pay high dividends and follow stable dividend policies.  
Another reason that might suggest that Omani firms may smooth their 
dividends is related to dividends signaling. The dividend signaling theory is based on 
the belief that investors prefer stable dividend over the years and firms are reluctant to 
cut dividends. John and Williams (1985) provide an important theoretical 
development of dividend smoothing hypothesis. They show that, in equilibrium, the 
optimal dividend policy is to pay smoothed dividends relative to stock prices. Their 
model implies that when dividends are used as a signaling mechanism firms are 
expected to smooth their dividends. In a similar vein, Guttman et al. (2008) show that 
dividend smoothing can arise from a coarse signaling equilibrium in a setting where 
managers have private information about firm value. Al-Yahyaee et al. (2009) find 
that Omani firms use dividends to signal their future prospects. Dividends are 
smoothed with respect to earnings to be a credible signal (Jeong, 2008). This may 
suggest that Omani firms use dividends as a signal to convey their private information 
to outsiders. Hence, Omani firms are more likely to smooth their dividends to 
strengthen the credibility of dividends as a signal of firm's future prospects.  
Fourth, over the period under study the Omani stock market generally lacks 
transparency, potentially allowing for exploitation of smaller shareholders by larger 
ones. Since monitoring is difficult in such cases, it may be substituted by higher 
dividends that may serve to mitigate this form of exploitation (Holderness and 
Sheehan, 1988). In the same vein, La Porta el al. (2000) propose a substitute 
hypothesis which asserts that a company with weaker legal protections of minority 
shareholders will pay more dividends to establish its reputation and compensate 
minority shareholders. Jiraporn and Ning (2006) find a negative correlation between 
dividend payout and the strength of shareholder rights, showing a case of the 
substitution hypothesis. This may suggest that Omani firms are more likely to pay 
dividends to mitigate the exploitation by large blockholders. 
Fifth, a feature of Omani listed firms is the variability in cash dividend 
payments. The majority of Omani firms change their dividends almost every year (Al-
Yahyaee et al., 2009). This contrasts with the practices observed in the U.S. and other 
developed countries where most stocks experience relatively few changes in their 
dividends.  In fact, Aharony and Swary (1980) find that about 87% of all firms had no 
change in quarterly dividend payments in the U.S. In the samples of Eades et al. 
(1985), and Bajaj and Vijh (1990), more than 80% of announcements involve no 
change in dividends. More recently, Hallock and Mashayekhi (2006) find that 80% of 
firms do not change their dividends in the U.S. during the period 1970-2000. The 
variability of dividends may suggest a diminished role of dividend stability in Oman.  
Finally, most previous research excludes non-dividend paying firms which 
may create a selection bias (Kim and Maddala (1992), Deshmukh (2003), among 
others). We take account of the selection problem by including non-dividend paying 
firms.   
Whether dividends are smoothed in Oman is an empirical matter. While 
studies in developed market have found that firms smooth their dividends, the picture 
is less clear in Oman. On the one hand, the relatively weak corporate governance, 
government ownership, and dividend signaling suggest that firms may have stable 
dividend policies. On the other hand, high bank leverage, the absence of taxes and the 
variability in cash dividend payments may suggest that firms may have unstable 
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dividend policies. Whether the net effect of these factors on dividend stability is 
positive or negative is an empirical matter.  
Just as in the U.S, our evidence shows that Omani firms have stable dividend 
policies. This stability of dividends do not support the predictions suggested by the 
high bank leverage, absence of taxes, and the variability of dividend payments in 
Oman. Dividend smoothing is consistent with the predictions suggested by the weak 
corporate governance, government ownership, and dividend signaling.    
Our findings show that there are differences in dividend policies between the 
Omani companies and those in developed markets. Consequently, potential investors 
in the Omani market should be aware about these differences in making their 
investment decisions. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the 
Lintner Model. Section 3 describes the institutional aspects of the Omani stock 
market. Section 4 describes the data and presents summary statistics for the payment 
of dividends, and reports some descriptive statistics for the sample. In section 5 we 
examine the stability of dividends using the Lintner model. Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
2. The Lintner Model 
In a frequently cited study, Lintner (1956) develops a quantitative model to test for 
the stability of dividend policy where he hypothesizes the following relationship 
between dividends and earnings: 
tt rED 
*
,          (1) 
where tD
*  is the target level of dividends for any year t, r is the target payout ratio, 
and Et is the firm’s net earnings in year t.  In addition, Lintner (1956) also predicts 
that a firm will only partially adjust to the target dividend level in any given year, so 
the change in dividend payments from year t-1 to year t is given by: 
ttttt uDDcDD   )( 1
*
1         (2) 
where α is the intercept term, c is the speed of adjustment coefficient, u is the error 
term, tD
*
 is the target dividend payment in period t, Dt is the actual dividend payment 
in period t and Dt-1 is the actual dividend payments in period t-1.   
Substituting rEt for the target dividend payment ( tD
*
) in equation (2), we arrive at the 
following model,  
ttttt uDEDD   1211         (3) 
where β1 = cr and β2 = -c. 
The constant term (α) is expected to have a positive sign “to reflect the greater 
reluctance to reduce than to raise dividends” Lintner (1956, p. 107).  The speed of 
adjustment coefficient (c) reflects that stability of dividends and measures the speed 
of adjustment toward the target payout ratio (r) in response to earnings changes.  The 
value c reflects the dividend smoothing behaviour of firms to changes in the level of 
earnings.  A higher value of c indicates less dividend smoothing and vice versa.  Thus, 
a conservative firm will have a lower adjustment rate, while a less conservative firm 
will have a higher adjustment rate. 
As shown by Lintner, equation (3) can be rewritten as: 
tttt uDccrED   )1()1(          (4) 
This model implies that firms set their dividends in accordance with current level of 
earnings, and that changes in dividends do not correspond exactly with the changes in 
earnings. 
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To test whether dividend policy in Oman is stable, we follow Fama and 
Babiak (1968) and use earnings per share (EPS) and dividends per share (DPS) rather 
than total earnings as follows: 
tttt uEPSDPSDPS   211         (5) 
where DPSt is the dividend per share for period t, EPSt is the earning per share for 
period t, and u is the error term.  Fama and Babiak argue that per share data are more 
appropriate for this test than the aggregate data used by Lintner. Indeed, almost all 
studies conducted since Lintner’s study employ per share data rather than aggregate 
data. This model has been used by many scholars to examine the stability of dividends 
such as Brittan (1964, 1966), Fama and Babiak (1968), Fama (1974), Dewnter and 
Warther (1998), Adaoglu (2000), Aivazian et al. (2003a), Omet (2004), Naceur et al. 
(2006), among others.   
Lintner’s model has been used by many studies in different countries 
including Chateau (1979) in Canada, Shevlin (1982) in Australia, McDonald et al. 
(1975) in France, Leither and Zimmermann (1993) in West Germany, UK, France, 
and Switzerland, Ariff and Johnson (1994) in Singapore, Lasfer (1996) in UK, 
Dewenter and Warther (1998) in Japan and US, Adaoglu (2000) in Turkey, Pandey 
(2003) in Malaysia, Stacescu (2006) in Switzerland, Naceur et al. (2006) in Tunisia, 
and Al-Malkawi (2005) for Jordan. Benartzi et al. (1997, p. 1032) conclude that 
“…Lintner’s behavioral model of dividends remains the best description of the 
dividend setting process available”.  
3. Oman Stock Market: Institutional Aspects 
3.1. Trading Rules and Practices  
Oman is a small free market economy with a stable social, political, and economic 
system, low taxation rates, steady economic growth, low inflation, a manageable level 
of external debt, fairly liberal investment laws, a sustainable level of budget deficit, 
and no controls over capital movements. In Oman, firms are subject to market 
economy discipline that is comparable to Western firms [5].  
Trading in the MSM was computerized in 1997. MSM is a pure auction 
market where trades are facilitated through brokerage firms. It is very different from 
the NYSE in that there are no specialists or market makers. Trading in the market is 
conducted by stockbrokers, who can not trade on their own account, which means that 
they have no role in setting cum- and ex-day prices. Orders are initiated from 
brokerage firms via computer terminals in their offices or on the exchange floor.  
Brokerage firms match buy and sell orders. Investors intending to buy or sell stocks 
execute their transactions through these brokerage firms that charge them a 
commission or transaction fees. The minimum fee that can be charged by a brokerage 
firm is 0.4% and the maximum is 0.75% (0.015% of the fee is revenue for the MSM).  
As Oman is a petroleum producing country, taxes play a minor role in 
generating income for the economy (Al-Yahyaee et al., 2008). As a result, 
shareholders are not subject to any taxes on dividends. Likewise, there are no taxes on 
capital gains. The only taxes are the 12% flat tax rate on corporate income. This 
makes the tax system in Oman one of the simplest in the world.  
 
3.2. Dividends 
Firms listed at the MSM distribute dividends in two forms namely, cash dividends and 
stock dividends. Paying dividends in one form or another is not compulsory.  If the 
board of directors proposes to distribute dividends, the details must be published in 
the daily newspapers. The proposed dividend is subject to the final approval of 
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shareholders at the Annual General Meeting (AGM). Generally, most dividend 
propositions are accepted at the AGM as the board of directors usually represents the 
majority of the share capital. The date when the AGM is held is the record date.  
Investors whose names are recorded as stockholders on this date are entitled to 
receive the declared dividend. The following date is the ex-dividend date. Firms 
usually pay dividends once a year. Some firms complement their cash dividends with 
stock dividends. 
4. Data 
The data for this study are obtained from “Share-Holding Guide of MSM Listed 
Companies” published by the MSM. As the data were available in hard copy only, the 
first task was to input the data into a computer database. The data set comprise all 
publicly traded non-financial firms listed at the MSM. These firms include industrial 
and service firms such as poultry, fisheries, agriculture, oil, and manufacturing firms.   
These data are time series cross-sectional variables which are collected over 
the entire life of the MSM from 1989 to 2004. We check the accuracy of the data by 
comparing the figures from the MSM Guide with the data from the firm’s financial 
statements available on the internet, where possible.   
The empirical literature on stability dividend policy has largely ignored firms 
that do not pay dividends. If value-maximizing firms choose not to pay dividends, a 
sample that contains only dividend paying firms will be subject to a selection bias.  
An econometric analysis of such a sample will yield biased and inconsistent 
estimates. To address this selection bias, we use both dividend-paying and non-
dividend paying firms. In this vein, Kim and Maddala (1992) demonstrate that it is 
important to allow for zero observations on dividends in the estimation of models of 
dividend behavior. Likewise, Deshmukh (2003, p. 353) states “If firms find it optimal 
to not pay dividends, then their exclusion from any empirical analysis may create a 
selection bias in the sample, resulting in biased and inconsistent estimates of the 
underlying parameters”[6].        
 
4.1. Estimation Model 
We examine the stability of dividend behavior in Oman using the Lintner model.  
Since there are some firms in Oman that do not pay dividends, this creates a censoring 
problem which needs to be addressed in estimating the Lintner model. In this case, 
previous research suggested the use of the Tobit model (Anderson, 1986; Kim and 
Maddala, 1992; and Huang, 2001a, 2001b). We use a Tobit model to test the stability 
of dividends in Oman [7].   
 
4.2. Payment of Dividends 
Omani firms tend to attract investors by distributing large dividends.  Most of the 
profitable Omani firms distribute dividends as a means of rewarding investors for 
holding their securities. Stock repurchase is a rare phenomena in Oman, however 
some firms supplement their cash dividends distributions with stock dividends [8]. 
In Oman, most profitable companies distribute 100% of their profits as cash 
dividends. This led the CMA to issue a circular (number 12) that requires firms to 
have a clear policy of dividends and to disclose it in their financial reports. With this 
regard, the circular states that 
“…studies have shown that the majority of Omani public joint stock 
companies currently operate with a dividend cover of 100% of its available profits 
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assigned to dividends…We are all required to set out a clear cut dividend policy with 
a view to the long term expansion of the company by striking the right mix to meet 
both good housekeeping practice (retention of some earnings appropriate to the 
economic conditions) and the understandable desire of shareholders for immediate 
returns.  CMA calls upon public joint stock companies to adopt prudent policies in 
cash dividends and to disclose the same in the annual report of the board of directors 
attached to the financial statements.” 
 
Table I. Dividend Payout Ratio for Omani Firms over the Period 1989-2004. 
Panel A: All Firms 
Year Mean StDev 
1989 40% 48% 
1990 36% 42% 
1991 39% 41% 
1992 55% 96% 
1993 171% 837% 
1994 56% 98% 
1995 39% 58% 
1996 40% 87% 
1997 37% 51% 
1998 32% 206% 
1999 30% 186% 
2000 76% 466% 
2001 42% 209% 
2002 54% 289% 
2003 25% 141% 
2004 56% 295% 
Overall period 48% 197% 
Observations 1077 
 
Panel B: Dividend Paying Firms  
Year Mean StDev 
1989 76% 41% 
1990 72% 30% 
1991 66% 33% 
1992 91% 111% 
1993 312% 1121% 
1994 106% 115% 
1995 80% 60% 
1996 81% 110% 
1997 70% 51% 
1998 281% 571% 
1999 258% 504% 
2000 371% 991% 
2001 166% 396% 
2002 166% 492% 
2003 69% 232% 
2004 157% 481% 
Overall period 151% 334% 
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Observations 545 
Notes: The table presents the mean and the standard deviation for firms listed at the MSM for each year 
from 1989-2004. In panel A, we present the results for all firms including both dividend paying and 
non-paying firms. In panel B, we report the results for dividend paying firms. 
 
As with other Arab countries, Omani investors seem to prefer to receive 
periodic income in the form of dividends (Bolbol and Omran, 2004). For the entire 
sample, Panel A of Table I shows that the average payout ratio is around 48%. When 
the zero dividend observations are removed, the average payout ratio increases 
considerably to 151% (Panel B). This is much higher than the payout ratio reported by 
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), Kaplan and Zingales (1997), and Aivazian et 
al. (2006) samples of US firms. It is also higher than 23.3% reported by Chen and 
Dhiensiri (2005) for New Zealand.   
 
5. Empirical Results 
The results presented in Table II show that both the coefficients on lagged DPS and 
EPS are statistically significant with a positive sign. But the generally higher 
coefficient and the associated t-statistic of the lagged DPS imply the greater 
importance of past dividend in deciding the dividend payment. These results are 
consistent with Lintner and suggest that the lagged DPS and EPS are important 
factors that affect the decision to pay dividends. The coefficient on the constant is also 
statistically significant with a negative sign [9]. This indicates that Omani firms are 
not reluctant to cut dividends, inconsistent with Lintner (1956).  
The objective of using the Lintner model in this paper is to examine whether 
Omani firms follow stable dividend policies. Consequently, we are interested in the 
speed of adjustment. The speed of adjustment reflects how quickly the firms adjust 
dividends towards the target ratio; the higher the speed of adjustment, the less the 
smoothness, and the less stability in dividends.  In our case, the speed of adjustment is 
0.2535 which indicates that Omani firms do smooth their dividends. This is close to 
the value of 0.30 obtained by Lintner for the US. Recently, Brav et al. (2005) find that 
the mean speed of adjustment for US companies with valid Compustat data is 0.67, 
0.4, and 0.33 for the 1950-1964, 1965-1983, and 1984-2002 periods, respectively. Our 
estimate is lower than that for the first period and close to those reported for the other 
two periods in Brav et al. Likewise, our speed of adjustment is similar to the 0.25 
documented by Andres et al. (2009) for Germany. However, it is lower than the 0.66 
reported by Stacescu (2006) for Switzerland. For emerging markets, our speed of 
adjustment is much lower than the 0.71 obtained by Pandey and Bhat (2007) for India. 
It is also considerably lower than the 0.52 documented by Omet (2004) for Jordan and 
the 1.00 reported by Adaoglu (2000) for Turkey.   
 
Table II. Lintner Model Estimates  
 Variable Coefficient T-Statistic 
C -0.4121*** -13.1435 
DPS-1 0.7465*** 14.6388 
EPS 0.1767*** 6.4442 
No of Observations 969 
Log Likelihood -579.9871 
Wald Test [χ
2
 (2)]  238.0600 
P-value  0.0000 
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Notes: We estimate Tobit regression for firms listed at the MSM over the period 1989-2004. The 
dependent variable is the dividend per share. The explanatory variables are the lagged DPS and the 
current EPS. The table shows the variable, their coefficients, and their corresponding t-statistics. (*), 
(**), and (***) represents significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels, respectively. The number in 
parenthesis in the Wald test represents the degrees of freedom.  
 
Another variable of interest is whether Omani firms have a target payout ratio 
or not. Lintner (1956) hypothesizes that firms set a long-term target payout ratio and 
move gradually towards the target. We calculate the target payout ratio and find that 
Omani firms have a target payout ratio of 0.6970 [10]. This value is higher than the 
0.50 reported by Lintner for the US. It is also higher than the 0.459 documented by 
Fama and Babiak (1968).   
6. Conclusion 
We investigate stability of dividend policy in a unique environment where firms 
distribute almost 100% of their profits in dividends and firms are highly levered. We 
use a panel data on a sample of Omani firms and take account of the zero observations 
using Tobit models.   
Our results show that Omani firms adopt a policy of smoothing dividends. 
This stability of dividends do not support the predictions suggested by the high bank 
leverage, absence of taxes, and the variability of dividend payments in Oman. The 
results lend support to the propositions put forward by the weak corporate 
governance, government ownership, and dividend signaling.    
The findings of this study show that there are differences in dividend policies 
between the Omani companies and those in developed markets. Potential investors in 
the Omani market should be aware about these differences in making their investment 
decisions. This study also highlights the need for further research in order to examine 
whether these results have any effect on dividend initiations and omissions in Oman. 
 
Notes 
1. See Aivazian et al. (2003a) for a discussion on the role of bank debt in reducing the 
agency cost. Fleming, Heaney, and McCosker (2005) also provide a discussion of the 
benefits of debt financing in alleviating the agency problem. 
2. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries include United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, 
Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Bahrain. 
3. The Capital Market Authority in June 2002, published its Corporate Governance Code 
(Circular No. 11/2002), which was later amended and replaced by Circular No. 
1/2003 of April 2003. The Code requires all listed companies to publish a section on 
corporate governance in their annual financial statements. This Code is not as 
elaborate as corporate governance regimes in western countries (Mohamed et al., 
2009)  
4. See Mohamed et al. (2008) for a detail description of Corporate Governance in Oman. 
5. See Al-Yahyaee (2006) for details on this issue.   
6. For further information on this issue, see Anderson (1986) and Kim and Maddala 
(1992). 
7. As a robustness check, we also use a random effects tobit regression. The random 
effects tobit regression shows a more rapid speed of adjustment than the tobit. Still, 
the results indicate that the lagged dividend per share is more important than the 
current earnings per share in determining the current dividend per share.    
8. It is possible for Omani companies to buy back their shares provided that they submit 
an application to the CMA where they have to list the reasons for buying back their 
shares. 
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9. The negative constant reported in this paper is consistent with the results documented 
by Kim and Maddala (1992), Huang (2001a, 2001b), and Al-Malkawi (2005) who 
utilize Tobit regression to estimate the Lintner model. 
10. We calculate the target payout ratio as (the coefficient on EPS divided by the speed of 
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